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Abstract What kind of institutions are needed to stabilize and foster democracy?
Clearly elections are crucial and much of the institutional and legal surrounding of
elections has been subject to research. Two institutional variables have been neglected
though, specifically in empirical research: Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) and
International Observer Missions (EOMs). Can EMBs and EOMs foster free and fair
elections? If yes, under what conditions? And what kind of competences are needed for
them? We hypothesize that both can become crucial institutions for free and fair
elections. Whereas independent central banks or audit courts control special issue
areas in order to take certain decision out of the realm of politics, EMBs control the
moment of the set-up of government—the election, when conflicts of interest of
politicians are at its peak. Although other kinds of independent administrative agen-
cies have been the subject of political science and economic research, EMBs and
EOMs have also been neglected here. This article undertakes to outline a conceptual
framework for testing various hypotheses on the institutional set-up of EMBs.
Hypothesizing that de iure and de facto independence of EMBs foster fair elections,
the detailed institutional set-up of EMBs as independent variable is outlined in order to
test for the level of democracy as a dependent variable. Furthermore, the importance of
EOMs as well as their interaction effect with EMBs is analyzed. Although by now
EOMs are sent to almost any country with elections, their impact has not been analyzed
in an encompassing way in spite of that the mission have intensified in their work, have
become more costly and their verdicts are gaining ever more publicity.
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While democracy must be more than free elections, its also true … that it
cannot be less.1
1 Introduction
Democracy is a peaceful procedure for the change of government but it is often
endangered especially if a government assumes that it may not be re-elected and
lose power. Democratic governments are defined as being accountable to the
electorate. But that might be insufficient for a well functioning democracy; they
must also be subject to restraint and oversight by other public agencies: this is the
idea of checks and balances.2 It is not sufficient that citizens control the state
(vertical accountability). The state organs must also mutually control themselves
(horizontal accountability).3 But even that might be insufficient. A further
accountability dimension for governments has become ever more important: the
international one. In the context of elections, this can mean the requirement for an
election to comply with political commitments made by a country through its
membership in international organizations such as the United Nations, the
Organization of American States (OAS), the African Union, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) or international legal commitments
through its ratification of universal or regional treaties such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.4 The compliance with its obligations is
monitored ever more by international election observer missions (EOMs) of
International Organizations (OSCE, European Union etc.) as well as Non
Governmental Organizations (NGOs).5
1 Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Speech at the International Conference ‘‘Towards a
Community of Democracies’’ (Warsaw, 27th June 2000). Press Release SG/SM/7467, www.un.org.
2 Early on (Madison 1788).
3 On the notion of vertical and horizontal accountability, see (Diamond et al. 1999). Whereas vertical
accountability refers to the control of government through mass media, civil society and citizens,
horizontal accountability refers to the capacity of state institutions to check abuses by other public
agencies and branches of government.
4 A right to democratic governance is regarded as an emerging human right. Seminal (Franck 1992). See
also the references to International Human Rights law, especially Art. 25 International Convenant on
Civil and Political Rights as well as Art. 21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 3 of the Protocol
to the European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 23 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 13
African Convention on Human and People’s Rights. Art. 21 UDHR states that: (1) Everyone has the right
to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. […] (3)
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.’’
Furthermore, democracy is often held to foster all kinds of desirable things, such as development,
welfare, autonomy, and security.
5 (United Nations 2005), Para 4 defines international election observation as follows: ‘‘International
election observation is: the systematic, comprehensive and accurate gathering of information concerning
the laws, processes and institutions related to the conduct of elections and other factors concerning the
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What kind of institutions are needed to stabilize and foster democracy? Much of
the institutional and legal setting of elections has been subject to research, but two
institutional variables have been neglected so far, specifically in empirical research:
Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs6) and EOMs. The questions that we ask in
this paper, hence, are: Can EMBs and EOMs foster free and fair elections? If yes,
under what conditions? And what kind of institutional set-up is adequate and what
kind of competences are needed for them? Are there any interaction effects between
those two commitment devices EMBs and EOMs?
EMBs as one species of Independent Administrative Agencies (IAAs) are usually
not at the forefront of the discussion on democracy, but—as I intend to show—can
become crucial as an institution when talking about democracy in the sense of free
and fair elections. Whereas most states hold elections,7 the fairness of the election
and the free expression of the voters’ will is by no means guaranteed. Elections can
be unfair, either because they are intentionally rigged, because campaign conditions
disproportionally favor the incumbent, or because administrative inefficiencies
exist. Election outcomes can also be ignored for several reasons, e.g., because the
winning party is deemed to abolish democracy in the future (as e.g., in Algeria
1991/1992). Whereas independent central banks or audit courts control special issue
areas of politics, EMBs control the moment of the set-up of government—the
election; a crucial moment as the de facto accountability of governments depends on
it. Unfair elections or electoral set-ups destroy the roots of accountability. If the re-
election constraint on politicians is the most powerful mechanism for re-alignment
of the citizens-principal with the politicians-agents interests, the moment of re-
election is also the most sensitive moment as potential conflicts of interest of the
agent is at its peak: on the one hand, she has to stand for re-election in order to
achieve legitimacy by holding free and fair elections, on the other hand, there is a
strong incentive to rig elections in order to stay in power. One solution for
mitigating the problems are EMBs. Elections are a necessary condition but may not
be sufficient for making governments accountable.8 Nevertheless, this necessary
condition for accountability has been neglected in so far as the institutional
delegation to an independent agency conducting the elections is concerned.
Depending on their set-up, they are able to prevent intentional rigging and/or
administrative inefficiencies. EOMs might help in both tasks by interacting with the
EMB and by providing international assistance and publicity. There are different
Footnote 5 continued
overall electoral environment; the impartial and professional analysis of such information; and the
drawing of conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on the highest standards for
accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis.’’
6 Those agencies take different names, have a variety of shapes and sizes, with a wide range of titles to
match, which include ‘Election Commission’, ‘Department of Elections’, ‘Electoral Council’, ‘Election
Unit’, or ‘Electoral Board’ or ‘electoral management body’ (EMB). See (International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2006, p. 5).
7 (Freedom House 2008) finds that 123 countries out of 193 were democratic in 2006.
8 Here, different conceptions, namely thin and thick notions of democracy come to the fore, see for the
former (Dahl 1971). In this paper, that discussion is not of relevance as EMBs and their role in securing
legitimate elections are in any case part of every thin notion of democracy.
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ways of international ‘‘intervention’’ in national elections: they might solely observe
the election, they might provide technical assistance by legal and logistic advice,
they might conduct poll worker training and voters’ education. They may also
supervise the election in that they intervene and certify each step of the electoral
process. In rare cases, where there is no governance structure in place, EOMs may
even administer the election themselves, as, e.g., in Kosovo or East Timor. In those
cases they substitute for the lack of a governmental authority.
Accountability of both governments and parliaments through a check on the
electoral process by EMBs and EOMs can be—and has been—viewed upon from
different angles but there has been no connecting discussion and to my knowledge
never an encompassing cross-country empirical testing. One strand of political
science literature has been preoccupied with EMBs but rather in a qualitative
manner or with very few countries being compared. No systematic and detailed
description of the institutional set-up of EMBs has been conducted. Empirically,
large scale panel studies are not existent to my knowledge.9 Especially NGOs10 and
International Organizations concerned with democracy and human rights, as, e.g.,
the UN, the EU, and the OSCE have been collecting information on the electoral
process and the institutional set-up of EMBs as well as on single elections but lack
theoretical background as well as empirical testing. Furthermore, the institutional
details covered are not adequate to discover the devil in the detail of the institutional
set-up. We will nevertheless refer to that literature. Furthermore, some empirical
testing has been done on EOMs but is restricted to a small sample of countries and
covers only parts of the tasks of EOMs. Donno (2006) tests a model of the strategic
interactions between the incumbent, the domestic opposition and the EOM and finds
that opposition allegations and mobilization are significantly more likely in the
presence of EOMs. Hyde (2004) finds that the presence of international observers
increases the probability that an opposition party will choose to boycott the election.
Their interaction effect with an EMB has not been looked at.
The main argument of this paper is that the institutional set-up of EMBs, and in
particular their independence from government, is one important variable influencing
the fairness of elections in a country as it might alter the game for the incumbents
tempted to rig an election. EOMs may also alter the game for the incumbents for
similar reasons. They are another way of outsourcing and committing oneself to an
honest election. The interaction effects of EOMs and EMBs will also be looked at.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. It constructs a
theoretical framework by combining different strands of rational choice political
science as well as economic literature and builds a conceptual framework for testing
the effectiveness of the institutional set-up of EMBs and international observer
missions on free and fair elections and thus ultimately on levels of democracy in
detail. I will first outline the theoretical background, bringing together different
strands of literature, then describe the relevant legal variables of IAAs in the
9 Similarly, (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002, p. 6): ‘‘neglected variable’’; (Pastor 1999a, p. 2), ‘‘Scholars
have sifted through dozens of variables to try to identify the causes and the consequences of democracy,
but one variable that has been missing is electoral administration.’’
10 The ACE Project is a common undertaking of NGOS and IGOs and provides ample information and
advice on elections. Especially IDEA is very active in publications.
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abstract while connecting the discussion to a more legal comparatist approach of
EMBs which highlights the institutional diversity of EMBs. This allows me to show,
first, that independence is not a binary variable but is to be found on a continuum
and needs to be looked at in detail (II). In the next chapter, some testable hypotheses
as to which set-up of EMBs will enhance democracy most will be generated (III).
The third, international dimension of election monitoring is discussed in the
following chapter (IV). The last chapter concludes (V).
2 EMBs and EOMs: why and how?
Democracy has long been an issue of practical and theoretical discussion, including
potentially necessary restrictions of the democratic principle. Though the rationale
of the delegation of powers to independent and international institutions, thereby
curtailing the democratic principle, has been much discussed in political economy,
it has not received any special attention when it comes to the ‘‘moment of truth’’ of
elections. In order to clarify the complexity of the issue it seems appropriate to first
clarify the theoretical background used here and second, detail the institutional set-
up of EMBs, drawing comparisons with other independent administrative agencies.
2.1 Theoretical framework
Often, democracy is viewed as a system of political competition by the economic
approach to democracy.11 There is, of course, one fundamental difference between
economic and political competition: whereas the first is conducted in a stable legal
framework set by other actors (politicians) than those competing within the rules
(market participants), the second necessarily has a partial overlap in the identity of
actors. Constitutional Political Economy distinguishes between constitutional and
post-constitutional settings or setting the rules of the game and playing within the
rules.12 In electoral settings, some of the rules are set on the constitutional level, but a
lot of rules are also embodied in either simple parliamentary laws or even directives
of administrative bodies. In those constellations, those actors setting the framework of
electoral laws are often the same who compete for political office. This may even hold
true for the constitutional level unless a constituent assembly includes only members
which are not allowed to compete for political office under the constitution to be
elaborated on. But tailor-made constitutions are no rarity. Of course, as time goes by,
those who have participated in the constituent assembly are not identical with those
persons who compete for political office anymore. But this is, unlike in the normal
market setting, not a categorical distinction. That aggravates potential conflicts of
interest but it also requires cooperation in setting up a fair and stable legal framework.
One strand of (mainly economic) literature is concerned with the delegation of
powers on certain issue areas to either the international level or to independent
agencies within a nation-state in order to mitigate commitment problems of the
11 Seminal (Schumpeter 1950); (Downs 1968).
12 (Buchanan 1975).
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government.13 The discussion on the proliferation of IAAs in certain issue areas,
such as central banks, audit courts, anti-trust bodies, anti-corruption commissions
and other economic regulatory agencies has been proliferating. There, the main
rationale for making agencies independent is the time inconsistency problem of
politicians, potential conflict of interests (e.g., in audit courts, and data protection
officers) as well as the necessity of expert knowledge.14 In EMBs we find a further
rationale: transparency on the division between deliberate electoral fraud and mere
inept administration of it. The institutional set-up of EMBs has been neglected in the
literature on IAAs, although EMBs are one kind of them.
Rational choice political science literature which has also been influential for the
economic literature on IAAs, has advanced the idea that a stable democracy depends
on a self-enforcing equilibrium.15 The fundamental question asked by this literature
concerns democratic stability. Why should an incumbent party or government that
has lost an election accept its loss instead of subverting the democratic process in
order to retain power? The answer is that sustaining democracy requires it to be self-
enforcing: it must be in the interest of the incumbents to accept their loss.16 That is
only the case if today’s losers find that the expected gain from accepting the loss
exceeds the gain from subverting the election. Though institutions play a role in the
pay-offs, the crucial variable in this literature is the citizens’ consensus to react
against the incumbents if they attempt to rig an election. That, in turn, is a function
of overcoming a coordination dilemma within the citizenry which depends much on
the de facto underlying structures of a jurisdiction, including distribution of wealth,
religious, linguistic and ethnic fractionalization, etc. Though institutions matter in
that frame,17 EMBs or EOMs get no special attention, especially not the institutional
details. But the coordination possibility may hinge upon two factors. One is the
possibility of gathering and campaigning, e.g., by holding election rallies. Here, the
presence of EOMs may hinder the obstruction by the incumbent government, solely
by registering what is going on and by providing more security for the opposition
and citizens. Furthermore, the creation and availability of focal points,18 such as
providing information on parties’ programs or parties’ behavior in the electoral
process, is necessary for coordination. EMBs as well as EOMs might contribute to
the creation of focal points—and thus mitigate the coordination problem of citizens.
Nevertheless, the game theoretic approach focuses mainly on the vulnerability of
the incumbent. Certainly this is one of the most important dimensions for free and
fair elections. But this theoretical underlying rationale can be fruitfully enriched by
using a taxonomy which is able to paint a more differentiated picture of where and
how EMBs and EOMs may influence the electoral process by including more
dimensions relevant for democratic accountability. It therefore seems appropriate to
13 (Voigt and Salzberger 2002); (Majone 2001).
14 (Alesina and Tabellini 2004) and (Quintyn forthcoming).
15 Seminal (Weingast 1997) who reveals through game theoretic analysis the approach taken in
(Przeworski 1991). This approach will also be followed here.
16 (Weingast 1997, p. 255).
17 (Weingast 1997, p. 255); (Przeworski 1991, p. 36).
18 Seminal (Schelling 1960).
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take a more differentiated rational choice approach to accountability dimensions
following Bartolini19 and match these dimensions with the detailed institutional set-
up of EMBs. He identifies four, sometimes conflicting, dimensions which matter for
democratic accountability: contestability, availability, decidability and vulnerabil-
ity. It is hypothesized here that those dimensions may be influenced by the
institutional set-up of EMBs as well as the presence of EOMs.
Contestability refers to the conditions of entry for political actors, especially
parties, into the political market. EMBs may—apart from the electoral laws (such as
percentage hurdles to get into parliament)—play a crucial role in several instances:
if they have the competence of deciding on the qualification of entering the race, if
they decide on district boundaries, if they assign quota for the access to media and
public money, etc. Thus, contestability as a prerequisite of electoral competition
might be influenced by EMBs. Furthermore, EOMs can exercise influence on the
acceptance of parties by an EMB through soft means, e.g., in the pre-election phase
by letting the EMB know that the non-acceptance of a certain party or the non-
assignment of equal media time for all competitors would get the label ‘‘unfair
election’’. Or it could warn the EMB that voting in military barracks for soldiers
would not be seen as a free vote. In case the EMB has law-making functions,
oftentimes the core team of an EOM advises already on electoral norms.
Availability refers to the demand elasticity of voters: how easily do voters switch
parties? Many causes can ‘‘lock in’’ voters, e.g., religious and ethnic affiliation
combined with closely knit social groups. Here, especially EOMs may take on a
crucial role through lowering costs for switching party affiliation through monitoring
the pre-election process and by securing a free and secret ballot. They may also lower
the costs not only by fostering the decision to vote but also by helping in voter
education. EMBs as well as EOMs, often in cooperation, built up citizens’
participation in the electoral process, e.g., by organizing educational campaigns for
de facto disenfranchised parts of the population, be it minorities or women.20
Decidability refers to the ‘‘product differentiation’’, that is, program or promise
differentiation of the political offers. We assume that decidability is not influenced
by EMBs and EOMs.
Vulnerability, i.e., the incumbents’ safety of tenure, is certainly at the heart of the
rationale of EMBs and EOMs. We hypothesize that both, independent EMBs as well
as EOMs may change the pay-offs of the incumbents’ through sanctions for rigging
the elections at hand. They may also give more security to the (losing) incumbent
that she might be able to win in another election by providing also for future
vulnerability of the then incumbent. That presupposes that an EMB is a stable
institution and its independence secured in the long run. Sanctions for rigging an
election can be direct sanctions or indirect sanctions, such as reputational losses.
Direct sanctions refer to the possibility of an EMB to secure that the incumbent has
less possibilities to secure tenure. Much depends on the competences an EMB has
for this purpose. That may range from the possibility of condemning certain
19 (Bartolini 1999, 2000).
20 Binder (2008, p. 85) identifies the failing to tackle the participation of those groups as one of the short
comings of EOMs.
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behavior publicly to excluding political actors from public office. Indirect sanctions
refer to reputational losses and its consequences. They are primarily ‘‘soft’’
sanctions, i.e., non-legal, and come to the fore primarily through EOMs. Let’s
assume that the incumbent rigs the election and the verdict is ‘‘unfree and unfair
election’’. That might influence the attitude of the international community towards
that state, e.g., by shutting the country out (or not pursuing its membership
application) of certain International Organizations (or committees thereof) or by
cutting down development aid. Those consequences might lower the utility for the
incumbent to stay in office and thus the incentive to rig the election.
Countries which have a tradition of a reliable and neutral bureaucracy dealing
with core tasks such as voter registration might not need any independent EMB but
can leave those tasks, e.g., with the Ministry of Interior under the supervision of
their courts.21 Separating the political from the technical is a difficult task and at the
forefront of making an election trustworthy. If elections are one mode of
‘‘institutionalizing uncertainty’’,22 i.e., enhancing uncertainty on who gets elected
(vulnerability), this substantive uncertainty has to be coupled with procedural and
administrative legitimacy and certainty in order to have a free and fair election. This
‘‘defines the central task of electoral governance: organizing electoral uncertainty by
providing institutional certainty.’’23 Independent EMBs are less needed in countries
where the administration is trusted, neutral and efficient. In established democra-
cies, elections tend to be routine events, usually producing well accepted results,
even if there is only a narrow margin. A completely flawless election does not
always take place; there will always be a margin of error, inaccuracies in counting,
or incomplete voter registers. As long as these errors occur randomly and do not
determine the electoral result, trust in the electoral procedure will not suffer. This is
not meant to imply that administrative problems in developed countries do not exist
and that trust in the fairness of the system may not be shattered, especially if
outcomes are tight24 but the scale of administrative potential for fraud is usually
smaller in established democracies with free media and trusted administrations.
Thus, the informational problem for the citizenry to know whether there has been
electoral fraud or not is smaller in countries with a trusted administration and/or free
media. If this informational hurdle is one hurdle for the coordination dilemma of
citizens to punish politicians rigging an election (Weingast), trust-generating
independent EMBs are a helpful device for stabilizing a democracy. Nevertheless,
setting up independent EMBs de iure is no panacea—they also need to be
independent de facto, that is, not captured by special interests.
The effect of EMBs can be enhanced by EOMs as they give a non-partisan, all
encompassing and quick verdict on the election process.25 Furthermore, EOMs give
technical advice—and might therefore mitigate the problem of ineptness of
21 Cf. (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002, p. 15).
22 (Przeworski 1988, p. 63).
23 (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002, p. 11).
24 As the contested Florida vote count of the US presidental elections in 2000 demonstrates.
25 EOMs usually release a preliminary assessment (‘‘statement of preliminary findings and conclusions’’)
immediately after the election.
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conducting the electoral administration. There might be different signals send out to
citizens and the opposition before and after an election. If no EOM is invited ex ante,
that can mean two things: either the incumbent is unwilling to have any international
monitoring in order to make rigging possible. Or it can signal that the elections are
anyhow free and fair and no EOM is needed to observe the election. EOMs presence,
although they are present also in old and well functioning democracies (e.g.
Switzerland), is almost unknown to the public in those countries and they usually do
not play a big role. Sometimes EOMs are invited but they decline to go as the
conditions in the country either do not allow for genuine democratic elections or that
security does not permit the necessary minimum conditions for an effective EOM.26
A well publicized invitation to EOMs may also signal to the citizenry that the
incumbent is ready to allow free and fair elections. Inviting EOMs but then
backtracking by not allowing them in the country in the usual manner sends the worst
signals to citizens and to the international community. If observers cannot be assured
of being able to fulfill their task which is very much a cooperative effort between the
government, the national EMB, civil society actors and the observers, they usually do
not go into the country (as, e.g., Russia experienced when not granting the observers
of the OSCE (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; ODIHR) free
access to the parliamentary elections in autumn 2007).27
The interaction effect of EMBs and EOMs can be manifold. Their interaction
effect can be neutral, that is, the effect of one does not influence the effect of the
other. The effect can be substitutive, that is, the tasks of EMBs or EOMs,
respectively, can be substituted without effect. Voter education, e.g., may be done by
both. A strong and administrative efficient EMB may be sufficient for guaranteeing a
fair election without the need for an EOM and vice versa—the presence of an EOM
may be a substitute for a national EMB, especially if the country has no functioning
government or administration. One has to keep in mind though, that EOMs have—
except for extraordinary cases—no legal competences whereas EMBs usually do,
that is they work through different mechanisms. A substitution therefore can only be
partial. The relationship may also be competitive in that both, the EMB and the EOM
work in counter directions. This is to be expected especially in situations where the
EMB is not de facto independent and rather a tool for the incumbent to stay in office.
The effects may also be complementary, that is, the tasks fulfilled by an EMB may be
enhanced and complemented by the EOM. We assume this to be the most likely
interaction effect. EMBs have usually well defined tasks and EOMs support those
tasks—e.g., by giving technical assistance and advice for voter registration and voter
education, by pressuring the government to adhere to the rules etc. Especially in
countries with weak administrative governance and unstable democracies or in
26 See (Binder 2008, p. 77) for examples (Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Chechnya).
27 Russia first tried to limit the number of observers by saying it would accept only 70 (while 400
observed the 2003 Duma elections in Russia). Second, it delayed the issuance of visas to the observers.
After 2 weeks of Russian foot-dragging on visas, ODIHR said it would not send observers to monitor the
election campaign because ‘‘entry visas have continuously been denied’’. Eventually, ODIHR pulled out
of monitoring the elections entirely, because it could not follow standard practice of observing the
elections in Russia for 1 or 2 months.
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transition-to-democracy countries, a strong complementary effect (and even
substitutive effect) of EOMs can be expected.
Assuming that there is both, a partially complementary and partially substitutive
relationship depending on the tasks, how can the interaction effect of EMBs and
EOMs be characterized? There are two most likely effects. If the governance quality
and the fairness of elections have a positive correlation, one can assume that EMBs
enhance both. If EOMs are present in the country in addition to independent EMBs,
they might contribute positively but with a diminishing return the higher the
governance quality of a country becomes. Graphically, that would mean that we
have asymptotical graphs. In other words: the effect of EOMs is higher when
governance quality is low and diminishes when it gets better. Another possibility is
that there is a shift effect by EOMs. But that only holds until a certain level of
governance quality is reached. At high levels of governance quality, no effect of
EOMs on the fairness of elections would then be found.
2.2 The institutional set-up of electoral management bodies
No common and clear-cut definition of IAAs, especially for the definition of
independence exists. The same holds true for EMBs as one example of IAAs. Also,
sometimes there is more than one body dealing with electoral tasks. With regard to
IAAs, conflicting goals—democracy/legitimacy on the one hand and interest-free
independent regulation on the other hand—are frequently discussed. With regard to
EMBs, those goals are not conflicting as their primary raison d’ eˆtre is to enhance
the fairness of elections and ultimately the level of democracy. Furthermore, there
are some special characteristics of EMBs which do not allow an easy comparison to
IAAs in the sphere of economic regulation. Usually IAAs have a defined and narrow
task tailored to avoid certain well-known conflicts of interest or the problems
involved with time-inconsistent preferences of politicians. Once the relevant
problem is identified, one finds quite similar institutional provisions in different
countries (e.g., central bank independence which varies only minimally from an
institutional point of view as their task is usually narrowly defined).28 EMBs do not
lend themselves so easily to institutional comparison as their set-up and their
competences for the electoral process vary considerably.
Usually, the main criterion for calling an agency independent is the freedom from
direct authority exercised by the executive branch, but the degree of independence
varies substantially between different (kinds of) EMBs. Legal autonomy is just a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for independence. In other words, even if the
agency is legally independent and does not form part of the bureaucratic structure,
this does not imply that it is independent. Rather, drawing a distinction between
independent and non-independent administrative agencies and EMBs, respectively,
is a multi-dimensional task. It allows only for a classification on a continuum, the
most important variables being the possibility of governmental instructions, the
position of the head of the EMB, as well as the scope of competences of the EMB.
Furthermore, the effect of legal variables often can cut both ways, depending on the
28 See for details (Quintyn forthcoming).
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underlying political circumstances in the respective country. If, e.g., a country has
highly dependent courts de facto, any judicial review would undermine even an de
facto independent EMB. Countries in transition to democracy, e.g., with a highly
(ethnically or religiously) fractionalized population, might be better off to choose a
representative EMB (containing party affiliates of all parties) instead of an expert
EMB (containing non-partisan experts). In spite of those difficulties in analyzing
EMBs compared to other IAAs, an attempt will be made for systematic analysis,
taking up the most important legal variables. Much of the literature on IAAs
identifies four criteria of independence: institutional, personal, financial and
functional.29 We will follow this distinction here. Furthermore, accountability of
EMBs through judicial review is shortly discussed.
2.2.1 Institutional independence
Institutional independence is the legal independence from government: the EMB is
set-up as a distinctive legal entity. The International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance (IDEA) distinguishes three basic models of setting up EMBs:
the independent, the governmental and the mixed or semi-autonomous models. The
crucial criteria for distinguishing an independent from a governmental model are the
legal set-up as well as the non-accountability to the executive branch, although the
EMB may be accountable to the legislature, the judiciary, or the head of state. Legal
independence allows an IAA to sue and to be sued. Usually, if the body is legally
independent from the government, it excludes the right of instructions by the
ministry.30 The governmental model is characterized by the fact that there is no
independent body but the electoral tasks are fulfilled by the ministries, usually the
Ministry of Interior. This model highlights that much of the electoral process
consists of classical administrative tasks. On the national level, usually no special
personnel other than the usual civil servants answerable to a cabinet minister exist.31
The governmental model automatically includes the right of instruction by the
government due to the hierarchical order of bureaucracy. Those instructions can
either concern the formulation of by-laws and general instructions or also specific
instructions, which in turn may allow only for questions of legality or also questions
of expediency. Under the mixed model of IDEA, the policy functions (which may
29 For a more thorough discussion on different types of IAAs, see (van Aaken 2005). See for this
distinction referring to central banks, (Dutzler 2002, p. 496) with further references. See also (Arnone
et al. 2007, p. 6 et seq.) for the assessment of autonomous central banks. For independent courts, see
(Salzberger 1993, p. 352) who distinguishes substantive and structural independence. This article focuses
on structural independence, that is, the institutional arrangements which enable the existence of
substantive independence.
30 In total, 119 countries have chosen this model of EMBs, e.g. Armenia, Australia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Estonia, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Mauritius,
Nigeria, Poland, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay. (International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance 2006, p. 304), Annex A counts 214 countries and territories.
31 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2006, p. 7). Denmark, New Zealand,
Singapore, Switzerland, Tunisia, the UK (for elections but not referendums) and the United States follow
this model. In Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the United States, elections are implemented by local
authorities. In Sweden and Switzerland, the central EMB assumes a policy coordinating role.
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be law-making functions) are separated from the administrative or implementing
function. Whereas the policy functions follow the independent model, the
administrative functions follow the governmental model. Under this model,
elections are organized by the component governmental EMB, with some level of
oversight provided by the component independent EMB.32 In some cases, the
independent part of the EMB is little more than a formalized observation operation,
although this version is dying out, having been abandoned for example by Senegal.
In other cases, the component independent EMB has a role to supervise and verify
the implementation of electoral events by the component governmental EMB.
Furthermore, there may be even more agencies involved, e.g. a Constitutional
Council engaged in the tabulation and declaration of results.33 More than in the
‘‘pure’’ models, the variables may lend themselves even less for classification as
policy competences, budgetary and personal independence are intermingled. This
creates a problem not only for academics but also seems to lead to frictions during
elections as competences are unclear.34
IDEA’s international 2006 survey of electoral management in 214 countries and
territories worldwide showed that 55% of all countries followed the Independent
Model, 26% the Governmental Model and 15% the Mixed Model.35 The first quick
overlook on the set-up of EMBs finds that EMBs in developed countries and
democracies are usually dependent or form part of the government, respectively.
Out of the 30 OECD countries, only 6 have an independent EMB, whereas 8 have
chosen the mixed model and 16 have the governmental model.36 While IAAs, e.g.,
independent central banks, have been the invention of the developed countries to be
exported to other countries later on, there appears to be no such trend-setting in the
sphere of EMBs.37 A second look might give an explanation: elections are not only
a highly politicized exercise but also a formidable administrative task.
2.2.2 Personal independence
Personal independence refers to the way the highest members of the EMB are
appointed, their status and whether and under what circumstances they can be
removed. Here, one finds the usual safeguards variables: are appointments for one
time only or may there be re-appointment, how are the heads protected against
arbitrary removal, do they have the usual immunity of judges, etc. Governmental
EMBs have no personal independence as members of the EMB are part of the
governmental bureaucracy. But for non-governmental EMBs, the extent of personal
independence becomes crucial. Usually, members of an independent EMB cannot
serve in the executive branch at the same time. Furthermore, members of an EMB
32 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2006, p. 8). It is used in France, Japan,
Spain and many former French colonies, especially in West Africa, for example Mali, Senegal and Togo.
33 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2006, p. 8).
34 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2006, p. 8).
35 The remaining 4% corresponds to countries that do not hold national level elections.
36 This list follows the IDEA categorization.
37 For a different pattern of diffusion of IAAs in the economic sphere, see (Gilardi et al. 2006).
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can either be experts or they can be partisan. Partisan EMBs are often chosen in
transition-to-democracy countries to augment trust in a neutral conduct of the
elections by securing oversight of all parties concerned. Members of the EMB can
be nominated by the electorate through an open procedure or they may be
nominated by parties or governmental, judicial or legislative organs. The first option
secures the most contestability but shifts electoral problems in the pre-election
phase. Thus, it makes only sense if there is already a save environment for fair
elections. Nomination by the government makes an EMB less independent,
nomination by the judiciary most independent if the latter is independent.
2.2.3 Financial independence
Financial independence refers to the ability of having own accounts (usually in
combination with institutional independence), as well as the question of who
decides on the budget. A legally independent body usually also has its own budget,
whereas an EMB which forms part of the government usually gets its funds out of
the general budget, e.g., of the ministry of interior, subject to allocative decisions by
the government. The budget falls under the budget of the ministry or local
administrations. If the budget of an IAA (or EMB) is decided by government and
not by parliament, that makes it easier to push IAAs in the desired direction with a
predictable result on its de facto independence. The question of who allocates the
budget thus may become crucial for independence. Furthermore, only if there is a
sufficient budget to carry out the tasks allocated to the EMB, can one talk of de facto
independence. Some EMBs have the possibility of accepting funds also from
international organizations or NGOs—a possibility making them more independent
from the incumbent government.
2.2.4 Functional independence
Functional independence defines the competences an EMB has; or put differently,
the level of delegation to the EMB. Looking at it through a principal-agent
framework, it might be that the principal, the government or the legislator,
constrains the EMB through detailed regulation by writing almost ‘‘complete
contracts’’.38 The discretion of EMB would therefore be curtailed. The extent of
competences thus embraces the question if and how far the agency is able to set and
specify its own goals. For EMBs, the tasks are usually not as narrowly defined as for
other IAAs such as central banks. Their competences can be categorized as rule-
making, rule-application and rule-adjudication competences and may thus vary
broadly. Can the EMB, e.g., take decisions on the passive right to vote, does it have
competence for the alignment of electoral districts, etc. or other laws regulating an
election, does it allocate media time to parties, does it monitor and control party and
candidate financing and does it have competences for sanctioning? IDEA defines as
their core or essential tasks the determination of who is eligible to vote; receiving
38 See (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002, p. 17).
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and validating the nominations of electoral participants (for elections, political
parties and/or candidates); conducting polling; counting and tabulating the votes.
Additionally, EMBs may have other tasks allocated such as the conduct of voter
registration, boundary delimitation, voter education and information, media
monitoring and electoral dispute resolution.39 One might view the core tasks as
predominantly administrative or technical tasks irrelevant for the fairness of an
election but that would be an underestimation of the potential in the more technical
and administrative area to manipulate elections. Guayana, e.g., registered the
deceased dictator on the voters’ list.40
2.2.5 Accountability of EMBs
Accountability can take on many forms: it may be asked to whom (government,
parliament, courts, the electorate, parties) an actor is accountable and for what kind
of issues and information. Here, I concentrate on the accountability of EMBs to
courts. This kind of accountability through judicial review infringes least on their
independence;41 would they be accountable to parliament or the executive that
would mean putting the fox in charge of the henhouse. There are several
possibilities for accountability constellations: either there is no possibility of review
whatsoever of any decision taken, there is only internal review, or there is judicial
review. In all cases, much depends on who is allowed to lodge a complaint.
Standing can be restricted to candidates, parties, or some organ of the state. It could
also be extended to all citizens eligible to vote. The standing provisions for either a
complaint at the EMB or a court have a gate-keeping function that might well make
a difference on accountability grounds. This implies that the factual degree of
accountability of the EMB depends on the independence of the courts. Indeed, even
if there were a de facto independent EMB which might be overturned by a court, all
depends on the latter’s de jure and de facto independence. Thus, if the judicial
system is biased and ineffective, it may actually subvert progress achieved in the
impartial and professional administration of elections.42
2.2.6 EMBs in the trias politica
Generally speaking, one can place EMBs in a framework of powers, all of them
defining independence and accountability through interaction, which is illustrated
by the following figure (Fig. 1).
39 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2006, p. 5 et seq.).
40 (Pastor 1999b, p. 133).
41 Accountability does not necessarily mean accountability to the government. Rather, an EMB may be
accountable to courts only. Then, independence of courts becomes important. Furthermore, one may
argue that independence and accountability of EMBs are not at cross-roads: an accountable EMB might
be able to strengthen its independence from the other branches of government through enhancing its
legitimacy.
42 See (Eisenstadt 2002) for electoral courts as well as (Feld and Voigt 2003) for normal courts.
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In this figure, we can identify the four dimensions of independence as well as
the accountability of EMBs. The delegation of powers to an EMB by the legislator
refers to functional independence. The scope of instructions and supervision refers
to institutional independence. Personal and financial independence are described
within the set-up of the EMB itself. Accountability mainly refers to the review
mechanisms an EMB is submitted to by complaints and the scope of judicial
review.
3 Does the set-up influence the level of democracy? Some hypotheses
The level of democracy has been attributed to many factors, from economic
development to colonial history and institutional variables.43 Nevertheless, the
institutional variable of the set-up of EMBs has been neglected and has never, to my
knowledge, been tested on a broad cross-country basis, although data is available on
the level of democracy as well as a rough textured indicator of IDEA on the
independence of EMBs. In my view, that latter indicator needs to be looked at more
carefully which necessitates a careful legal comparatist analysis in order to find the
Legislature
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Fig. 1 EMBs within the network of state powers
43 See (Lijphart 1999) and (Lipset 1959) and for a survey on economic development and democracy
(Sunde 2006).
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interactions of legal variables described above; as usual, the devil is in the
(legal) details. The following hypotheses will draw a framework for later empirical
testing.
3.1 What level of democracy?
The first difficulty in generating testable hypotheses is already the concept of the
dependent variable: the level of democracy.44 There are not only conceptual
problems but also data availability problems.45 I will concentrate on the former but
use a thin notion of democracy (that is elections only). Although one may agree that
the level of democracy can be (partially) conceptualized by the necessary condition
of free and fair elections, it is by no means clear when an election is free and fair. A
first approach is to rely on the dictum of EOMs (which may have different dicta on
the same election). The dictum of EOMs on an election is usually drafted in a
bimodal term (sometimes a qualification is added as ‘‘substantially free and fair’’).
The dictum is thus a fuzzy concept with multi-dimensional elements: an election
can, e.g., be fair on the administration but problematic on how the electoral districts
are drawn, leaving the seats largely uncontested (‘‘gerrymandering’’). The second
possibility is an objective measurement by looking at the process of the election and
possible irregularities. This would call for a check-list of the steps (in a time
sequence of election management).46 For a comprehensive empirical analysis that
poses huge problems as first, data may not be available on all countries and
elections; second, check-lists leave open the question how to weigh the points on the
list and how to aggregate them.47 A third option is to use a subjective approach
where various actors may be relevant. Pastor suggests that a flawed election is ,,one
in which some or all of the major political parties refuse to participate in the election
or reject the results’’.48 A fourth, more comprehensive subjective approach would be
to ask those affected and participating, similar to the Transparency International
approach for measuring corruption. In elections, citizens, grass root activists,
international observers and (opposition) parties would need to be asked by opinion
44 There is, of course, a problem of endogeneity when institutions serve as explanatory variables. The
problem seems to be quite severe here: on the one hand, it seems quite reasonable to assume that EOMs
are much more likely to be sent if the level of democracy is low. On the other hand, it may be that only
those governments that intend to hold free and fair elections allow EOMs into their countries the first
place. A similar reasoning applies for independent EMBs: maybe they are only drawn up if (1) the
administrative efficiency is low or (2) of the fairness of past elections has been deplorable. In other words:
control for reversed causality and selection effects is needed. The standard solution is to draw on
instrumental variables. Adequate instruments are usually hard to find. One possible instrument could be
international aid receipts/GDP. A pragmatic solution of the problem is to look at the fairness of the last
election which took place before international observer missions were sent (controlling for other
exogenous shocks such as coups and so forth). A break point test could then reveal whether sending an
international observer mission is identified as a structural break. A qualitative analysis of borderline cases
may also help to gain empirical leverage over such issues.
45 For a discussion on the measurement of democracy, see (Munck and Verkuilen 2002).
46 (Elklit and Reynolds 2002), Table 1 (p. 92 et seqq.).
47 (Pastor 1998, p. 159) and (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002, p. 19).
48 (Pastor 1999a, p. 15).
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polling. That would require an ‘‘Electoral Integrity Perception Index’’ which, alas,
does not exist yet.49 A further fifth possibility is to account for changes in
government. Even ,,if the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the proof of
democracy is in the alternation of government’’,50 that would be a very crude
measure as it may well happen that governments stay legitimately in power for
longer periods of time. More recent approaches try to combine (some of) those
criteria. An elaborated framework for studying election quality, looking at process
as well as outcome has been proposed by Elklit and Reynolds in 2005,51 but there is
no overall assessment usable as a data set. The advantage of their proposition is that
it takes stock only of the necessary condition of democracy, the election only, but
leaves out other factors in the assessment of democracy, such as education or press
freedom (although those may also be important for free elections). Ideally, those
variables may be controlled for separately in an empirical assessment as that would
allow for more precise estimations. Although these conceptional problems are by no
means solved, for an empirical study, it seems permissible to use the level of
democracy variables supplied by the ‘‘Freedom House Index’’ or the Polity IV
Project. Furthermore, one may test for electoral competitiveness as a proxy for the
livelihood of political competition and the vulnerability of the incumbents.52 To
sum up: no available variable is a perfect proxy for what we have in mind. Yet,
some of the available variables seem to be fair proxies.
3.2 Independent variables
Drawing on the classification of IDEA into independent, governmental and mixed
models seems too superficial to generate reliable results though they give a first
overview on institutional models found. Furthermore, often, the relevant variables
interact, e.g., financial independence and institutional independence. Therefore, the
following hypotheses distinguish between the different modes of independence as
outlined above and discuss possible interaction effects with a view to Bartolini’s
four dimensions of accountability.
3.2.1 Functional independence
As described above, the power conferred on EMBs can vary broadly: it may be
restricted to purely administrative functions such as setting up the voter registry or
vote counting, thus only leaving space for law application (which in turn might be
controlled or not by either courts or the government). But the delegation might also
be much broader: it may entail law-making functions and also adjudicatory
functions. Though usually the basic framework of the electoral system, as
proportional v. majoritarian system as well as the size of electoral districts is
predetermined by the constitution or by parliamentary laws, it might be that the
49 (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002, p. 19).
50 (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002, p. 20).
51 (Elklit and Reynolds 2005).
52 For Indices of Electoral Competitiveness, see (Beck et al. 2000).
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EMB has the task of drawing district boundaries, as, e.g., in Germany, but it might
also be that this task is left to the legislator with potential conflicts of interest, as in
the US. Clearly, if the EMB is independent and the scope of its tasks is broad, there
is less possibility for the government to take influence on the electoral process.
Depending on the competences allocated to an EMB, the other dimensions of
independence (i.e., personal, functional and financial) become more important. If,
e.g., the EMB can decide on the boundaries of electoral districts (rule-making), this
requires a more personally independent EMB than if the competences are confined
to voter registration (pure rule-application) as the conflict of interest and the
possibility of rigging elections becomes even greater. In short: the more tasks
relevant to the electoral process are assigned to an EMB, the more its independence
defined by the other dimensions is a prerequisite for free and fair elections.
Hypothesis 1a The more tasks which involve potential conflict of interests of
legislators or government are outsourced to an EMB, the fairer the electoral process
will be, given that the EMB is personally, financially as well as institutionally
independent. But if the EMB is personally, financially as well as institutionally
dependent, no degree of functional independence is expected to have an effect on
the dependent variable.
Law application, that is, administrative and technical tasks, becomes more
important if the general level of the quality of administrative governance is low.
Many rather technical steps in the electoral process can then be easily misused by
politicians to rig elections. Outsourcing the technical and administrative tasks to an
EMB and taking it out of the normal executive hierarchy can contribute to a more
professional conduct of elections as well as heightened trust in the electoral process,
especially if the EMB is permanent and composed of experts. As has been
mentioned before, countries with high administrative effectiveness and neutrality
often leave the technical tasks to their ordinary administration. We thus assume that
the independence of EMBs is less important in countries which have a high level of
good governance.
Hypothesis 1b If the general level of administrative capability and neutrality is
low, the outsourcing of those tasks to an independent EMB will make the election
fairer.
Hypothesis 1c The better the general level of administrative capability and
neutrality (good governance), the fairer the electoral process will be, notwithstand-
ing the institutional set-up of the EMB.
3.2.2 Institutional independence
If an EMB is part of the government, the minister has the right to issue instructions
and thus has the EMB under control. Instructions may be general or specific and
they may be allowed only for parts of the competences of the EMB (e.g., only the
technical part) or also on the more politicized part. The government may—by
general or specific instructions—take direct, and plainly legal, steps in order to
secure the election for itself (in a presidential system) or for its necessary majority
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in parliament (in a parliamentary system). Specific instructions in any case make an
EMB dependent on the government as also purely technical matters allow for
securing elections. If the set-up is such that the government can influence the
electoral process in a legal manner, there is less scope for the opposition (or an
EOM) to protest. There is thus also more of a coordination problem for citizens. If
no external general or specific instructions may be given legally, the independence
is at least de iure secured, though of course the other dimensions of independence
come to the fore here in order to determine its de facto independence.
Hypothesis 2a An institutionally independent EMB will lead to a higher
probability of fair elections.
Hypothesis 2b If the legal system provides for the possibility that members of the
executive can give direct orders to the EMB, the probability of unfair election is
higher than otherwise, other variables being equal.
A growing number of countries are incorporating fundamental electoral
provisions in their constitutions, often including the type, composition and
responsibilities of the EMB. Countries like Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Fiji, Ghana,
India, Indonesia and Uruguay set-up their respective EMBs as constitutional bodies.
This makes it more difficult to alter their status and other constitutionally defined
elements. Therefore, a government would find it more difficult to change provisions
in order to influence the election. That, though, holds only if the independence is
guaranteed in the constitution as otherwise, it might become even more difficult for
the opposition to negotiate an independent EMB for the next elections. The
constitutional set-up of an EMB conforms to the game theoretic approach of
Weingast, as it gives the incumbent a better guarantee that he may win the election
in another round, thus shifting the pay-offs from rigging an election. Clearly, such a
constitutional amendment needs cooperation in the generation of rules: a consensus
to dissent and respect the game in each election.
Hypothesis 2c If the EMB is set-up as an independent body by the constitution,
the higher the probability that the election will be fair.
Furthermore, a permanent EMB, or at least an EMB whose duration extends over
several electoral cycles will be able to deliver better results. If an EMB is created ad
hoc for each election (temporary EMBs), not only could it be staffed with members
close to the incumbent government more easily, but also expertise may be missing
and thus undue influence may be more easily taken by the incumbent government.
The EMB also would be more at the mercy of the normal administrative network
which is more likely to be influenced by the government. Furthermore, IAAs can
also develop some kind of internal independence, know-how, and legitimacy in the
eyes of the citizenry if they are permanent, as, e.g. courts often do. That would also
strengthen their powers vis-a`-vis other branches of government. Thus, it is
hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 2d A permanent EMB will increase the likelihood of a fair election.
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3.2.3 Personal independence
Usually, the EMB is constituted of several persons. It might or might not have a
president. If it has a president, his/her position will be a major factor determining
the personal independence. If the EMB is not hierarchically structured, the position
of all members is relevant. Furthermore, recruitment for an EMB may be multi-
party based or expert based.53 Some countries require expertise in electoral issues or
legal expertise as well as non-partisanship and exclude members which hold
executive or other posts. The latter might thus give a higher degree of personal
independence. If the opposition wants control over the electoral process and should
be included in order to participate, a multi-party based EMB may generate more
trust. In that case, not impartiality is the idea but equal representation. This may be
especially important in transition-to-democracy countries.
Hypothesis 3a Expert EMBs will increase the probability of fair elections unless
the election is taking place in a transition-to-democracy phase.
Three aspects will be distinguished when determining the personal independence
of the EMB from the executive and the legislature, namely (i) term length (ii)
renewability, (iii) appointing organ, and (iv) removal procedure. Life tenure and
appointment by others than politicians will guarantee the greatest personal
independence, while appointment by politicians for a renewable term generates
the lowest independence, as it can be expected to motivate EMBs to cater to the
interests of the organ that has the power to re-elect them. Appointment for a non-
renewable fixed term will generate more personal independence than appointment
for a renewable term. Independence of the EMB will also depend on the term length
and its congruence with the length of the electoral cycle. If the (head of the) EMB
term length is only for one election, renewable before each next one, that would
impede personal independence.
Hypothesis 3b Life-long tenure or a non-renewable term with a length over
several electoral cycles will increase the independence of the (head of the) EMB,
which should increase the probability of a fair election.
Nomination and appointment may be done by different branches. Nomination is
often done by a different branch of government having the appointing authority or
even the populace. The competence on nomination has a gate-keeping function. It
will nevertheless be neglected here as the final say is in the appointment procedure.
Three basic modes of appointing of the (head of the) EMB can be distinguished.54
Those modes are either ‘‘pure’’ or mixed. They are ordered from the mode which
generates the lowest degree of personal independence to the mode, which is
hypothesized to generate the highest level of personal independence: (i) appoint-
ment by members of executive;55 (ii) election by the legislature or its subset; (iii)
appointment by members of the judiciary.
53 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2006, p. 88 et seqq.).
54 Those procedures are usually determined by the electoral laws.
55 Formal appointment by, e.g., the head of state will not be counted as this is usually a pure formality.
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(i) Appointment by members of the executive, which is constituted by the party
in power, is probably the ‘‘less’’ common system of appointment for an
independent EMB. It would be expected to lead to a high probability of
misusing the EMB in the electoral process.56 This is especially the case if the
government is unlikely to change frequently (as is the case in, for example,
Japan).
(ii) The consequences of having the (head of the) EMB appointed by the
legislature depends on the political institutions of a country. In parliamentary
systems with plurality voting (such as the British), it would not seem to make
much of a difference if it is the executive or the legislature that appoints. Both
cases generate low personal independence. In contrast, in systems with
proportional representation and/or presidential systems, it might very well
make a difference, and appointment by the legislature will significantly lower
the probability of the EMB being misused in the electoral process. In addition,
appointment by the legislature is usually more transparent than by the
executive and can entail public debate, which can be seen as an obstacle for
the appointment of persons who are expected to be too loyal to the appointing
government. Furthermore, the majority of parliament by which a member of
the EMB is chosen may be crucial; a two-thirds majority, e.g., would give
effective veto-power to minority parties.57
(iii) Appointment by a body of judges is expected to lead to a high degree of
independence from the executive. It will lead to comparatively more
independence than appointment by the executive or the legislature, if the
judiciary is independent.58
Hypothesis 3c Appointment by the judiciary, given that it is independent, will
generate more independence from the parties in power. Appointment by the
executive will lead to least independence.
Removal from office is another important factor in the determination of the
personal independence. If the (head of the) EMB may be removed at will by the
executive, the incentive to resist political pressure will be reduced. The position of
the (head of the) EMB varies; some countries allocate them the same protection
against removal as to supreme or constitutional court judges. Some countries have
explicit provisions for the removal of office, e.g., the need for a two-thirds majority
of parliament (as, e.g., in Albania), but a lot do not. Some countries also grant
immunity to the (head of the) EMB shielding them against criminal procedures as
they do for high level judges. Here, a de facto indicator may also be generated
which illustrates the de facto term length of a member in comparison with the de
iure term length.
56 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2006, p. 96).
57 As, e.g., in Mexico, Nigeria, Uruguay and Yemen.
58 In Costa Rica, e.g., the Supreme Court of Justice unilaterally appoints the members of the EMB by a
two-thirds majority.
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Hypothesis 3d Protection against arbitral removal and immunity form prosecution
will enhance the personal independence of the (head of the) EMB and lead to a
higher likelihood of fair elections.
3.2.4 Financial independence
Starving an EMB of money to fulfill its tasks, no matter how independent it is de iure,
will heavily influence its de facto independence. Most countries have chosen to have
parliament determining the budget of the EMB instead of the president or the prime
minister.59 In seven countries, the president determines the budget: Argentina, Chile,
Ecuador, Mali, Micronesia, Panama, Paraguay. In four countries, it is the prime
minister (Cambodia, Mauritius, Puerto Rico, Tonga). A national government
department or some other organ within the national government chooses the budget
in 26 countries.60 In 92 countries, the budget is determined by the legislator. Whether
that contributes to the independence of the EMB depends on how many parties are
represented in parliament. Nevertheless, it may safely be assumed that parliament
will be more representative than the executive and therefore that the budget will not
be used for partisan purposes. Budgetary independence is thus one measure which
may be an indicator of de facto independence. If the EMB has the possibility of
accepting funds also from international organizations, its de facto independence will
increase further. Here, the interplay with EOMs may also come to the fore. If external
funds include technical assistance, e.g., means of communication for the EMB, the
possible control of the electoral process through the activation of public opinion
possibly changes the pay-off from rigging an election (vulnerability) but may also
increase availability of the voters. It may also mitigate the administrative inefficiency
problem by providing funds for technical assistance. Budgetary independence is thus
one measure which may be an indicator of de facto independence.
Hypothesis 4a If the budget of the EMB is determined by parliament, the higher
the probability that the election will be fair.
Hypothesis 4b The possibility of accepting funds from International Organiza-
tions by the EMB increases the probability of a fair election.
3.2.5 Accountability of EMBs
When it comes to adjudicatory functions of an EMB, independence and accountability
may be at counter trends. An EMB may either have adjudicatory functions itself or
those functions may be exercised by a specialized court (as in Mexico) or by the
general courts, usually the highest court in the country. Clearly, this allows for cross-
checking of decisions of the EMB and thus augments an EMB’s accountability. But
one needs to look carefully at the competences an EMB has and which ones of those
59 Cf. http://aceproject.org/epic-en/em/Epic_view/EM04 (last modified March 4, 2006).
60 Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Congo
(Brazzaville), Czech Republic, Dominica, French Polynesia, Guyana, India, Italy, Japan, Madagascar,
Marshall Islands, Mexico, Nepal, New Caledonia, Portugal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tuvalu,
Wallis and Futuna.
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are open to adjudicatory control. If the EMB has, e.g., the competence to disqualify
candidates, thus infringing on individual rights (passive or active voting rights), an
internal review mechanism alone might be insufficient, as individual rights may be at
stake, thus requiring review by an independent court. If an EMB has purely
administrative tasks, it might be more acceptable to have only an internal review
mechanism. Nevertheless, if, e.g., the voters registration list is rigged, opposition
parties or other state organs could or could not have the possibility of having standing
to review the list. As standing rights have a gate-keeping function for the
accountability of EMBs, the broader the standing right, the higher the accountability.
If the courts are independent, an external review is desirable as this would augment the
accountability. This argument applies to law application as well as law making
competences of EMBs. If courts are not independent and judicial review is allowed,
than the independence of EMBs might be a de facto farce as the government may take
influence through the courts and thus be able to reverse any decision made by an
independent EMB. Thus, court control can cut both ways:
Hypothesis 5a The broader the scope of judicial review of the decisions of the
EMB, the higher the probability of fair elections iff the courts are de facto
independent.
4 International election monitoring: A third form of accountability
Outsourcing tasks to the international or supranational level in order to make
commitments credible is by no means restricted to elections.61 NGOs and
International Organizations can even become a functional surrogate for domestic
institutions which are not (yet) established or up to their task (e.g., outsourcing issues
to international organizations and courts in human rights issues, environmental
issues, trade and investment). In contrast, as elections are thought to be a pure
internal matter, a matter of domestic sovereignty, the boundary between the national
and the international sphere is more tightly drawn in electoral issues than, e.g., in
economic matters. Nevertheless, an erudition of domestic sovereignty can be
observed as international election observation has become an ever bigger ‘‘business’’
since the end of the cold war as democracy has spread around the world, starting with
the invitation of international observers of the Noriega government of Nicaragua in
1989.62 International monitoring sits at the intersection of the ‘‘right’’ of the people to
democratic governance on the one hand and sovereignty rights of states on the other
61 See, e.g., (Voigt et al. 2007) on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
62 (Pastor 1999b, p. 125) classifies Nicaragua as the first observer mission similar to those conducted
now. The United Nations first called upon to observe elections in 1,947 on the Korean peninsula. Through
the era of trusteeship and decolonization, the United Nations supervised and observed plebiscites,
referenda and elections worldwide even before the end of the cold war. UN-monitored elections were key
elements of the transitions to peace in places such as Namibia, Cambodia, and Central America and in
helping bring about the end to apartheid. Today, the United Nations rarely fields its own observers. This
task is more commonly carried out by regional organizations and international NGOs, frequently in
conjunction with national groups. The OSCE, the EU, the Carter Center (US) as well as many other actors
are involved, usually cumulatively in one place. The OSCE alone has conducted more than 150 EOMs
between 1990 and 2005. See (Binder 2008), (Donno 2006) and (Hyde 2004).
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hand. Technically speaking though, if we do not talk about cases where the United
Nations or some other power administer territories (as e.g., in Kosovo), there is no
infringement of sovereignty as states need to invite international observers. Whole
substitution of the tasks of an EMB is thus rare and usually only to be found in
administered territories. Partial substitution is found often—EOMs thus acquire
partially national administrative functions.
International election observation is believed to have the potential to enhance the
integrity of election processes, by deterring and exposing irregularities and fraud and by
providing recommendations for improving electoral processes. The latter is especially
important for transitional countries. It is also thought to promote public confidence, as
warranted, promote electoral participation and mitigate the potential for election-
related conflict.63 Thus, by inviting international observers, a government ,,buys’’
expertise and credibility. Furthermore, it enhances its vulnerability by submitting to
monitoring—as the verdict might create a focal point and enhance coordination of
citizens and the opposition to oppose a rigged election (as e.g., in Ethiopia in 2005). The
dictum of an international mission that the election has not been free and fair might stir
internal unrest. A negative verdict might also provoke reactions by the international
community or other states, e.g., by cutting development aid, by denying trade
preferences or by generating unfavorable reputational effects for the government as
being illegitimate. Furthermore, the international community may sanction the
incumbent directly by introducing a visa ban and the freezing of assets.64 Nevertheless,
those possible sanctions by the international community might not be implemented if
the country has any other geo-political importance, as e.g., Egypt or Ethiopia.
The legal basis for an EOM is usually a Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs),
thus a non-legally binding instrument. Those MoUs contain the basic rights and
duties of the election observers and usually guarantee them free access to all
relevant material and places.65 In order for an EOM to effectively and credibly
conduct its work, basic conditions must be met. An EOM therefore should not be
organized unless the country holding the election guarantees certain rights to the
observers. The observers guarantee to behave according to the Codes of Conduct for
Election Observers.66
The influence of international election observers has not been empirically tested for
the level of democracy as such,67 in spite of the huge efforts and budget put into them.
The effect of EOMs on the fairness of elections can cut two ways: Either ex ante by the
63 For a discussion of the potential and limits of EOMs from a legal point of view, see (Binder 2008).
64 This happened, e.g., after the flawed presidential elections in Belarus, where the EU Council adopted
those measures, Council Common Position 2006/276/CFSP of 10th April 2006 Concerning Restrictive
Measures Against Certain Officials of Belorus (2006) OJ L1001/5.
65 E.g. the MoU between the EU and Ethiopia for the elections of 2005, Art. 4: ‘‘The Parties agree that
members of the European Union Observer Mission shall enjoy freedom of movement without prior
notification throughout the country and shall have free access to all polling stations, counting/tabulation/
aggregation centres, the media, political parties, candidates, voters and civil society representatives. 2.
The Parties also agree that European Union election observers shall have access to all election officials
and relevant information until the completion of the election process.’’
66 (United Nations 2005), (European Commission 2008).
67 But see (Hyde 2004) and (Donno 2006).
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technical advice given to the country (thus making the administrative tasks of the
election more trustworthy). Here, much depends on the scope of the task (‘‘high-
scope’’ missions or small short term observers68) of EOMs. Or, by sanctioning the
incumbent government ex post through indirect means and thus altering the pay-off of
the government for rigging elections. Given that there is no direct (international) legal
mechanism for sanctioning an unfair election, two hypotheses can be tested for a de
facto effect:
Hypothesis 5a Countries with a weak technical system of election administration
will have fairer elections if there are election observers.
Hypothesis 5b Countries receiving a high level of development aid (in relation to
GDP) will have fairer elections if there are election observers.
5 Conclusion and outlook
Drawing on different strands of literature, this paper constitutes a first step towards
analyzing the incentives—and the ensuing effects—generated by alternative
institutional arrangements concerning the set-up of EMBs in interaction with
EOMs. If free and fair elections are a necessary condition of democracy and if the
fairness and freeness of an election depends also on the institutional organization of
the electoral process, the set-up of EMBs can be assumed to have an effect on the
level of democracy. Within the framework of constitutional political economy, that
is a well accepted assumption but it has never been tested empirically using detailed
institutional data. This paper remains for now at a conceptual stage and the
empirical work concerning EMBs and EOMs remains to be done. Whereas there is,
though not sufficiently detailed work on EMBs by NGOs such as IDEA, there has
been no more than anecdotal evidence on the effects of the institutional set-up of
EMBs and EOMs on the level of democracy. This is even more astonishing as
international observer missions have become very important all over the world and
their dicta are widely reported in the press.
There are many more issues and influencing variables to be explored in this
context. Also there is no one-size-fits-all EMB. Rather, the institutional set-up has to
be adopted to the political and social circumstances of a given country. It seems
worth to explore under what circumstances what kind of set-up is enhancing fair and
free elections.
A further interesting research question is to endogenize EMBs. This research would
ask the following questions: Under what circumstances do countries set-up indepen-
dent EMBs with a variety of competences? Under what circumstances do they admit
EOMs and to what extent? As identified only anecdotally, the less established a
democracy and the lower the administrative effectiveness of a country, the higher the
probability that it delegates administrative electoral tasks to an independent EMB.
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